SATURDAY, June 21, 1788. — Convention met pursuant to adjournment.
The Hon. Mr. WILLIAMS rose, and addressed the chair. We are now, sir, said
he, to investigate and decide upon a Constitution, in which not only the present
members of the community are deeply interested, but upon which the happiness or
misery of generations yet unborn is, in a great measure, suspended. I therefore
hope for a wise and prudent determination. I believe that this country has never
before seen such a critical period in political affairs. We have felt the
feebleness of those ties by which the states are held together, and the want of
that energy which is necessary to manage our general concerns. Various are the
expedients which have been proposed to remedy these evils; but they have been
proposed without effect; though I am persuaded that, if the Confederation had
been attended to as its value justly merited, and proper attention paid to a few
necessary amendments, it. might have carried us on for a series of years, and
probably have been in as great estimation with succeeding ages as it was in our
long and painful war, notwithstanding the frightful picture that has been drawn
of our situation, and the imputation of all our difficulties to the want of an
energetic government. Indeed, sir, it appears to me that many of our present
distresses flow from a source very different from the defects in the
Confederation. Unhappily for us, immediately after our extrication from a cruel
and unnatural war, luxury and dissipation overran the country, banishing all
that economy, frugality, and industry, which had been exhibited during the
war.
Sir, if we were to reassume all our old habits, we might expect to prosper.
Let us, then, abandon all those foreign commodities which have hitherto deluged
our country, which have loaded us with debt, and which, if continued, will
forever involve us in difficulties. How many thousands are daily wearing the
manufactures of Europe, when, by a little industry and frugality, they might
wear those of their own country! One may venture to say, sir, that the greatest
part of the goods are manufactured in Europe by persons who support themselves
by our extravagance. And can we believe a government ever so well formed can
relieve us from these evils? What dissipation is there from the immoderate use
of spirits! Is it not notorious that men cannot be hired, in time of harvest,
without giving them, on an average, a pint of rum per day? so that, on the
lowest calculation, every twentieth part of the grain is expended on that
article; and so, in proportion, all the farmer's produce. And what is worse, the
disposition of eight tenths of the commonalty is such, that, if they can get
credit, they will purchase unnecessary articles, even to the amount of their
crop, before it becomes merchantable. And therefore it is evident that the best
government ever devised, without economy and frugality, will leave us in a
situation no better than the present.
Sir, the enormous expense of the article of tea will amount, in two years, to
our whole foreign debt. Much more might be said on the subject; but I fear I
have trespassed on your patience already. The time of the committee would not
have been so long taken up, had there not appeared a propriety in showing that
all our present difficulties are not to be attributed to the defects in the
Confederation; and, were the real truth known, part of its defects have been
used as an instrument to make way for the proposed system; and whether or not it
is calculated for greater emoluments and more placemen the committee will
determine. However, from what has been said, and the mode agreed on for our
proceedings, it appears probable that the system of government under
consideration is preferred before the Confederation. This being the case, let us
examine whether it be calculated to preserve the invaluable blessings of
liberty, and secure the inestimable rights of mankind. If it be so, let us adopt
it. But if it be found to contain principles that will lead to the subversion of
liberty, — if it tends to establish a despotism, or, what is worse, a tyrannical
aristocracy, — let us insist upon the necessary alterations and amendments.
Momentous is the question, and we are called upon by every motive to examine
it well, and make up a wise and candid judgment.
In forming a constitution for a free country like this, the greatest care
should be taken to define its powers, and guard against an abuse of authority.
The constitution should be so formed as not to swallow up the state governments:
the general government ought to be confined to certain national objects; and the
states should retain such powers as concern their own internal police. We should
consider whether or not this system is so formed, as, directly or indirectly, to
annihilate the state governments. If so, care should be taken to check it in
such a manner as to prevent this effect. Now, sir, with respect to the clause
before us, I agree with the gentlemen from Albany and Duchess, who spoke
yesterday. The number of representatives is, in my opinion, too small to resist
corruption. Sir, how guarded is our state Constitution on this head! The number
of the Senate and House of Representatives proposed in the Constitution does not
surpass those of our state. How great the disparity, when compared with the
aggregate number of the United States! The history of representation in England,
from which we have taken our model, is briefly this: Before the institution of
legislating by deputies, the whole free part of the community usually met for
that purpose: when this became impracticable by increase of numbers, the people
were divided into districts, from each of which was sent a number of deputies,
for a complete representation of the various orders of the citizens within them.
Can it be supposed that six men can be a complete representation of the various
orders of the people of this state?
I conceive, too, that biennial elections are a departure from the true
principles of democracy. A well-digested democracy has advantages over all other
forms of government. It affords to many the opportunity of being advanced, and
creates that desire of public promotion, and ardent affection for the public
weal, which are so beneficial to our country. It was the opinion of the great
Sidney and Montesquieu that annual elections are productive of this effect. But
as there are more important defects in the proposed Constitution, I shall desist
making any further observations at this time.
In order to convince gentlemen it is my sincere intention to accede to this
system, when properly amended, I give it as my opinion that it will be best for
gentlemen to confine themselves to certain points which are defective.
Before I conclude, I would only mention, that while, on one hand, I wish
those endowed with a spirit of moderation through the whole debate, to give way
to small matters, yet, on the other hand, not to be intimidated by imaginary
dangers; for to say that a bad government must be established for fear of
anarchy, is, in reality, saying that we must kill ourselves for fear of dying.
Mr. M. SMITH. I had the honor, yesterday, of submitting an amendment to the
clause under consideration, with some observations in support of it. I hope I
shall be indulged in making some additional remarks in reply to what has been
offered by the honorable gentleman from New York.
He has taken up much time in endeavoring to prove that the great defect in
the old Confederation was, that it operated upon states instead of individuals.
It is needless to dispute concerning points on which we do not disagree. It is
admitted that the powers of the general government ought to operate upon
individuals to a certain degree. How far the powers should extend, and in what
cases to individuals, is the question.
As the different parts of the system will come into view in the course of our
investigation, an opportunity will be afforded to consider this question. I
wish, at present, to confine myself to the subject immediately under the
consideration of the committee. I shall make no reply to the arguments offered
by the honorable gentleman to justify the rule of apportionment fixed by this
clause; for, though I am confident they might be easily refuted, yet I am
persuaded we must yield this point, in accommodation to the Southern States. The
amendment therefore proposes no alteration to the clause in this respect.
The honorable gentleman says, that the clause, by obvious construction, fixes
the representation. I wish not to torture words or sentences. I perceive no such
obvious construction.
I see clearly that, on one hand, the representatives cannot exceed one for
thirty thousand inhabitants; and, on the other, that whatever larger number of
inhabitants may be taken for the rule of apportionment, each state shall be
entitled to send one representative. Every thing else appears to me in the
discretion of the legislature. If there be any other limitation, it is certainly
implied. Matters of moment should not be left to doubtful construction. It is
urged that the number of representatives will be fixed at one for thirty
thousand, because it will be the interest of the larger states to do it. I
cannot discern the force of this argument. To me it appears clear, that the
relative weight of influence of the different states will be the same, with the
number of representatives at sixty-five as at six hundred, and that of the
individual members greater; for each member's share of power will decrease as
the number of the House of Representatives increases. If, therefore, this maxim
be true, that men are unwilling to relinquish powers which they once possess, we
are not to expect the House of Representatives will be inclined to enlarge the
numbers. The same motive will operate to influence the President and Senate to
oppose the increase of the number of representatives; for, in proportion as the
House of Representatives is augmented, they will feel their own power
diminished. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that a suitable number
of representatives should be established by the Constitution.
It has been observed, by an honorable member, that the Eastern States
insisted upon a small representation, on the principles of economy. This
argument must have no weight in the mind of a considerate person. The difference
of expense, between supporting a House of Representatives sufficiently numerous,
and the present proposed one, would be twenty or thirty thousand dollars per
annum. The man who would seriously object to this expense, to secure his
liberties, does not deserve to enjoy them. Besides, by increasing the number of
representatives, we open a door for the admission of the substantial yeomanry of
our country, who, being possessed of the habits of economy, will be cautious of
imprudent expenditures, by which means a greater saving will be made of public
money than is sufficient to support them. A reduction of the numbers of the
state legislatures might also be made, by which means there might be a saving of
expense much more than sufficient for the purpose of supporting the general
legislature; for as, under this system, all the powers of legislation, relating
to our general concerns, are vested in the general government, the powers of the
state legislatures will be so curtailed as to render it less necessary to have
them so numerous as they now are.
But an honorable gentleman has observed, that it is a problem that cannot be
solved, what the proper number is which ought to compose the House of
Representatives, and calls upon me to fix the number. I admit that this is a
question that will not admit of a solution with mathematical certainty; few
political questions will; yet we may determine with certainty that certain
numbers are too small or too large. We may be sure that ten is too small, and a
thousand too large a number. Every one will allow that the first number is too
small to possess the sentiments, be influenced by the interests of the people,
or secure against corruption; a thousand would be too numerous to be capable of
deliberating.
To determine whether the number of representatives proposed by this
Constitution is sufficient, it is proper to examine the qualifications which
this house ought to possess, in order to exercise their power discreetly for the
happiness of the people. The idea that naturally suggests itself to our minds,
when we speak of representatives, is, that they resemble those they represent.
They should be a true picture of the people, possess a knowledge of their
circumstances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and be
disposed to seek their true interests. The knowledge necessary for the
representative of a free people not only comprehends extensive political and
commercial information, such as is acquired by men of refined education, who
have leisure to attain to high degrees of improvement, but it should also
comprehend that kind of acquaintance with the common concerns and occupations of
the people, which men of the middling class of life are, in general, more
competent to than those of a superior class. To understand the true commercial
interests of a country, not only requires just ideas of the general commerce of
the world, but also, and principally, a knowledge of the productions of your own
country, and their value, what your soil is capable of producing, the nature of
your manufactures, and the capacity of the country to increase both. To exercise
the power of laying taxes, duties, and excises, with discretion, requires
something more than an acquaintance with the abstruse parts of the system of
finance. It calls for a knowledge of the circumstances and ability of the people
in general — a discernment how the burdens imposed will bear upon the different
classes.
From these observations results this conclusion — that the number of
representatives should be so large, as that, while it embraces the men of the
first class, it should admit those of the middling class of life. I am convinced
that this government is so constituted that the representatives will generally
be composed of the first class in the community, which I shall distinguish by
the name of the natural aristocracy of the country. I do not mean to give
offence by using this term. I am sensible this idea is treated by many gentlemen
as chimerical. I shall he asked what is meant by the natural aristocracy,
and told that no such distinction of classes of men exists among us. It is true,
it is our singular felicity that we have no legal or hereditary distinctions of
this kind; but still there are real differences. Every society naturally divides
itself into classes. The Author of nature has bestowed on some greater
capacities than others; birth, education, talents, and wealth, create
distinctions among men as visible, and of as much influence, as titles, stars,
and garters. In every society, men of this class will command a superior degree
of respect; and if the government is so constituted as to admit but few to
exercise the powers of it, it will, according to the natural course of things,
be in their hands. Men in the middling class, who are qualified as
representatives, will not be so anxious to be chosen as those of the first. When
the number is so small, the office will be highly elevated and distinguished;
the style in which the members live will probably be high; circumstances of this
kind will render the place of a representative not a desirable one to sensible,
substantial men, who have been used to walk in the plain and frugal paths of
life.
Besides, the influence of the great will generally enable them to succeed in
elections. It will be difficult to combine a district of country containing
thirty or forty thousand inhabitants, — frame your election laws as you please,
— in any other character, unless it be in one of conspicuous military, popular,
civil, or legal talents. The great easily form associations; the poor and
middling class form them with difficulty. If the elections be by plurality, — as
probably will be the case in this state, — it is almost certain none but the
great will be chosen, for they easily unite their interests: the common people
will divide, and their divisions will be promoted by the others. There will be
scarcely a chance of their uniting in any other but some great man, unless in
some popular demagogue, who will probably be destitute of principle. A
substantial yeoman, of sense and discernment, will hardly ever be chosen. From
these remarks, it appears that the government will fall into the hands of the
few and the great. This will be a government of oppression. I do not mean to
declaim against the great, and charge them indiscriminately with want of
principle and honesty. The same passions and prejudices govern all men. The
circumstances in which men are placed in a great measure give a cast to the
human character. Those in middling circumstances have less temptation; they are
inclined by habit, and the company with whom they associate, to set bounds to
their passions and appetites. If this is not sufficient, the want of means to
gratify them will be a restraint: they are obliged to employ their time in their
respective callings; hence the substantial yeomanry of the country are more
temperate, of better morals, and less ambition, than the great. The latter do
not feel for the poor and middling class; the reasons are obvious — they are not
obliged to use the same pains and labor to procure property as the other. They
feel not the inconveniences arising from the payment of small sums. The great
consider themselves above the common people, entitled to more respect, do not
associate with them; they fancy themselves to have a right of preeminence in
every thing. In short, they possess the same feelings, and are under the
influence of the same motives, as an hereditary nobility. I know the idea that
such a distinction exists in this country is ridiculed by some; but I am not the
less apprehensive of danger from their influence on this account. Such
distinctions exist all the world over, have been taken notice of by all writers
on free government, and are founded in the nature of things. It has been the
principal care of free governments to guard against the encroachments of the
great. Common observation and experience prove the existence of such
distinctions. Will any one say that there dues not exist in this country the
pride of family, of wealth, of talents, and that they do not command influence
and respect among the common people? Congress, in their address to the
inhabitants of the province of Quebec, in 1775, state this distinction in the
following forcible words, quoted from the Marquis Beccaria: "In every human
society there is an essay continually tending to confer on one part the height
of power and happiness, and to reduce the other to the extreme of weakness and
misery. The intent of good laws is to oppose this effort, and to diffuse their
influence universally and equally." We ought to guard against the government
being placed in the hands of this class. They cannot have that sympathy with
their constituents which is necessary to connect them closely to their
interests. Being in the habit of profuse living, they will be profuse in the
public expenses. They find no difficulty in paying their taxes, and therefore do
not feel public burdens. Besides, if they govern, they will enjoy the emoluments
of the government. The middling class, from their frugal habits, and feeling
themselves the public burdens, will be careful how they increase them.
But I may be asked, Would you exclude the first class in the community from
any share in legislation? I answer, By no means. They would be factious,
discontented, and constantly disturbing the government. It would also be unjust.
They have their liberties to protect, as well as others, and the largest share
of property. But my idea is, that the Constitution should be so framed as to
admit this class, together with a sufficient number of the middling class to
control them. You will then combine the abilities and honesty of the community,
a proper degree of information, and a disposition to pursue the public good. A
representative body, composed principally of respectable yeomanry, is the best
possible security to liberty. When the interest of this part of the community is
pursued, the public good is pursued, because the body of every nation consists
of this class, and because the interest of both the rich and the poor are
involved in that of the middling class. No burden can be laid on the poor but
what will sensibly affect the middling class. Any law rendering property
insecure would be injurious to them. When, therefore, this class in society
pursue their own interest, they promote that of the public, for it is involved
in it.
In so small a number of representatives, there is great danger from
corruption and combination. A great politician has said that every man has his
price. I hope this is not true in all its extent; but I ask the gentleman to
inform me what government there is in which it has not been practised.
Notwithstanding all that has been said of the defects in the constitution of the
ancient confederacies in the Grecian republics, their destruction is to be
imputed more to this cause than to any imperfection in their forms of
government. This was the deadly poison that effected their dissolution. This is
an extensive country, increasing in population and growing in consequence. Very
many lucrative offices will be in the grant of the government, which will be
objects of avarice and ambition. How easy will it be to gain over a sufficient
number, in the bestowment of offices, to promote the views and the purposes of
those who grant them! Foreign corruption is also to be guarded against. A system
of corruption is known to be the system of government in Europe. It is practised
without blushing; and we may lay it to our account, it will be attempted amongst
us. The most effectual as well as natural security against this is a strong
democratic branch in the legislature, frequently chosen, including in it a
number of the substantial, sensible yeomanry of the country. Does the House of
Representatives answer this description? I confess, to me they hardly wear the
complexion of a democratic branch; they appear the mere shadow of
representation. The whole number, in both houses, amounts to ninety-one; of
these forty-six make a quorum; and twenty-four of those, being secured, may
carry any point. Can the liberties of three millions of people be securely
trusted in the hands of twenty-four men? Is it prudent to commit to so small a
number the decision of the great questions which will come before them? Reason
revolts at the idea.
The honorable gentleman from New York has said, that sixty-five members in
the House of Representatives are sufficient for the present situation of the
country; and, taking it for granted that they will increase as one for thirty
thousand, in twenty-five years they will amount to two hundred. It is admitted,
by this observation, that the number fixed in the Constitution is not sufficient
without it is augmented. It is not declared that an increase shall be made, but
is left at the discretion of the legislature, by the gentleman's own concession;
therefore the Constitution is imperfect. We certainly ought to fix, in the
Constitution, those things which are essential to liberty. If any thing falls
under this description, it is the number of the legislature. To say, as this
gentleman does, that our security is to depend upon the spirit of the people,
who will be watchful of their liberties, and not suffer them to be infringed, is
absurd. It would equally prove that we might adopt any form of government. I
believe, were we to create a despot; he would not immediately dare to act the
tyrant; but it would not be long before he would destroy the spirit of the
people, or the people would destroy him. If our people have a high sense of
liberty, the government should be congenial to this spirit, calculated to
cherish the love of liberty, while yet it had sufficient force to restrain
licentiousness. Government operates upon the spirit of the people, as well as
the spirit of the people operates upon it; and if they are not conformable to
each other, the one or the other will prevail. In a less time than twenty-five
years, the government will receive its tone. What the spirit of the country may
be at the end of that period, it is impossible to foretell. Our duty is to frame
a government friendly to liberty and the rights of mankind, which will tend to
cherish and cultivate a love of liberty among our citizens. If this government
becomes oppressive, it will be by degrees: it will aim at its end by
disseminating sentiments of government opposite to republicanism, and proceed
from step to step in depriving the people of a share in the government. A
recollection of the change that has taken place in the minds of many in this
country in the course of a few years, ought to put us on our guard. Many, who
are ardent advocates for the new system, reprobate republican principles as
chimerical, and such as ought to be expelled from society. Who would have
thought, ten years ago, that the very men, who risked their lives and fortunes
in support of republican principles, would now treat them as the fictions of
fancy? A few years ago, we fought for liberty; we framed a general government on
free principles; we placed the state legislatures, in whom the people have a
full and a fair representation, between Congress and the people. We were then,
it is true, too cautious, and too much restricted the powers of the general
government. But now it is proposed to go into the contrary, and a more dangerous
extreme — to remove all barriers, to give the new government free access to our
pockets, and ample command of our persons, and that without providing for a
genuine and fair representation of the people. No one can say what the progress
of the change of sentiment may be in twenty-five years. The same men who now cry
up the necessity of an energetic government, to induce a compliance with this
system, may, in much less time, reprobate this in as severe terms as they now do
the Confederation, and may as strongly urge the necessity of going as far beyond
this as this is beyond the Confederation. Men of this class are increasing: they
have influence, talents, and industry. It is time to form a barrier against
them. And while we are willing to establish a government adequate to the
purposes of the Union, let us be careful to establish it on the broad basis of
equal liberty.
Mr. HAMILTON then resumed his argument. When, said he, I had the honor to
address the committee yesterday, I gave a history of the circumstances which
attended the Convention, when forming the plan before you. I endeavored to point
out to you the principles of accommodation on which this arrangement was made,
and to show that the contending interests of the states led them to establish
the representation as it now stands. In the second place, I attempted to prove
that, in point of number, the representation would be perfectly secure. Sir, no
man agrees more perfectly than myself to the main principle for which the
gentlemen contend. I agree that there should be a broad democratic branch in the
national legislature. But this matter, sir, depends on circumstances. It is
impossible, in the first instance, to be precise and exact with regard to the
number; and it is equally impossible to determine to what point it may be proper
in future to increase it. On this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my
reasonings on this subject of government, I rely more on the interests and
opinions of men, than on any speculative parchment provisions whatever. I have
found that constitutions are more or less excellent as they are more or less
agreeable to the natural operation of things. I am, therefore, disposed not to
dwell long on curious speculations, or pay much attention to modes and forms;
but to adopt a system whose principles have been sanctioned by experience, adapt
it to the real state of our country, and depend on probable reasonings for its
operation and result. I contend that sixty-five and twenty-six, in two bodies,
afford perfect security, in the present state of things; and that the regular
progressive enlargement, which was in the contemplation of the general
Convention, will leave not an apprehension of danger in the most timid and
suspicious mind. It will be the interest of the large states to increase the
representation. This will be the standing instruction to their delegates. But,
say the gentlemen, the members of Congress will be interested not to increase
the number, as it will diminish their relative influence. In all their reasoning
upon this subject, there seems to be this fallacy: They suppose that the
representative will have no motive of action, on the one side, but a sense of
duty; or on the other, but corruption. They do not reflect that he is to return
to the community; that he is dependent on the will of the people, and that it
cannot be his interest to oppose their wishes. Sir, the general sense of the
people will regulate the conduct of their representatives. I admit that there
are exceptions to this rule: there are certain conjunctures, when it may be
necessary and proper to disregard the opinions which the majority of the people
have formed. But, in the general course of things, the popular views, and even
prejudices, will direct the actions of the rulers.
All governments, even the most despotic, depend, in a great degree, on
opinion. In free republics, it is most peculiarly the case. In these, the will
of the people makes the essential principle of the government; and the laws
which control the community receive their tone and spirit from the public
wishes. It is the fortunate situation of our country, that the minds of the
people are exceedingly enlightened and refined. Here, then, we may expect the
laws to be proportionably agreeable to the standard of perfect policy and the
wisdom of public measures to consist with the most intimate conformity between
the views of the representative and his constituent. If the general voice of the
people be for an increase, it undoubtedly must take place. They have it in their
power to instruct their representatives; and the state legislatures, which
appoint the senators, may enjoin it also upon them. Sir, if I believed that the
number would remain at sixty-five, I confess I should give my vote for an
amendment, though in a different form from the one proposed.
The amendment proposes a ratio of one for twenty thousand. I would ask by
what rule or reasoning it is determined that one man is a better representative
for twenty than thirty thousand. At present we have three millions of people; in
twenty-five years, we shall have six millions; and in forty years, nine
millions. And this is a short period, as it relates to the existence of states.
Here, then, according to the ratio of one for thirty thousand, we shall have, in
forty years, three hundred representatives. If this be true, and if this be a
safe representation, why be dissatisfied? Why embarrass the Constitution with
amendments that are merely speculative and useless? I agree with the gentleman,
that a very small number might give some color for suspicion. I acknowledge that
ten would be unsafe; on the other hand, a thousand would be too numerous. But I
ask him, Why will not ninety-one be an adequate and safe representation? This,
at present, appears to be the proper medium. Besides, the President of the
United States will be himself the representative of the people. From the
competition that ever subsists between the branches of government, the President
will be induced to protect their rights, whenever they are invaded by either
branch. On whatever side we view this subject, we discover various and powerful
checks to the encroachments of Congress. The true and permanent interests of the
members are opposed to corruption. Their number is vastly too large for easy
combination. The rivalship between the houses will forever prove an insuperable
obstacle. The people have an obvious and powerful protection in their state
governments. Should any thing dangerous be attempted, these bodies of perpetual
observation will be capable of forming and conducting plans of regular
opposition. Can we suppose the people's love of liberty will not, under the
incitement of their legislative leaders, be roused into resistance, and the
madness of tyranny be extinguished at a blow? Sir, the danger is too distant; it
is beyond all rational calculations.
It has been observed, by an honorable gentleman, that a pure democracy, if it
were practicable, would be the most perfect government. Experience has proved
that no position in politics is more false than this. The ancient democracies,
in which the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good
government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure, deformity. When they
assembled, the field of debate presented an ungovernable mob, not only incapable
of deliberation, but prepared for every enormity. In these assemblies, the
enemies of the people brought forward their plans of ambition systematically.
They were opposed by their enemies of another party; and it became a matter of
contingency, whether the people subjected themselves to be led blindly by one
tyrant or by another.
It was remarked yesterday, that a numerous representation was necessary to
obtain the confidence of the people. This is not generally true. The confidence
of the people will easily be gained by a good administration. This is the true
touchstone. I could illustrate the position by a variety of historical examples,
both ancient and modern. In Sparta, the ephori were a body of magistrates,
instituted as a check upon the senate, and representing the people. They
consisted of only five men; but they were able to protect their rights, and
therefore enjoyed their confidence and attachment. In Rome, the people were
represented by three tribunes, who were afterwards increased to ten. Every one
acquainted with the history of that republic will recollect how powerful a check
to the senatorial encroachments this small body proved; how unlimited a
confidence was placed in them by the people, whose guardians they were; and to
what a conspicuous station in the government their influence at length elevated
the plebeians. Massachusetts has three hundred representatives; New York has
sixty-five. Have the people in this state less confidence in their
representation than the people of that? Delaware has twenty-one. Do the
inhabitants of New York feel a higher confidence than those of Delaware? I have
stated these examples to prove that the gentleman's principle is not just. The
popular confidence depends on circumstances very distinct from considerations of
number. Probably the public attachment is more strongly secured by a train of
prosperous events, which are the result of wise deliberation and vigorous
execution, and to which large bodies are much less competent than small ones. If
the representative conducts with propriety, he will necessarily enjoy the
good-will of the constituent. It appears, then, if my reasoning be just, that
the clause is perfectly proper, upon the principles of the gentleman who
contends for the amendment; as there is in it the greatest degree of present
security, and a moral certainty of an increase equal to our utmost wishes.
It has been further, by the gentlemen in the opposition, observed, that a
large representation is necessary to understand the interests of the people.
This principle is by no means true in the extent to which the gentlemen seem to
carry it. I would ask, Why may not a man understand the interests of thirty as
well as of twenty? The position appears to be made upon the unfounded
presumption that all the interests of all parts of the community must be
represented. No idea is more erroneous than this. Only such interests are proper
to be represented as are involved in the powers of the general government. These
interests come completely under the observation of one or a few men; and the
requisite information is by no means augmented in proportion to the increase of
number. What are the objects of the government? Commerce, taxation, &c. In
order to comprehend the interests of commerce, is it necessary to know how wheat
is raised, and in what proportion it is produced in one district and in another?
By no means. Neither is this species of knowledge necessary in general
calculations upon the subject of taxation. The information necessary for these
purposes is that which is open to every intelligent inquirer, and of which five
men may be as perfectly possessed as fifty. In royal governments, there are
usually particular men to whom the business of taxation is committed. These men
have the forming of systems of finance, and the regulation of the revenue. I do
not mean to commend this practice. It proves, however, this point — that a few
individuals may be competent to these objects, and that large numbers are not
necessary to perfection in the science of taxation. But grant, for a moment,
that this minute and local knowledge the gentlemen contend for is necessary; let
us see if, under the new Constitution, it will not probably be found in the
representation. The natural and proper mode of holding elections will be, to
divide the state into districts, in proportion to the number to be elected. This
state will consequently be divided, at first, into six. One man from each
district will probably possess all the knowledge gentlemen can desire. Are the
senators of this state more ignorant of the interests of the people than the
Assembly? Have they not ever enjoyed their confidence as much? Yet, instead of
six districts, they are elected in four; and the chance of their being collected
from the smaller divisions of the state consequently diminishes. Their number is
but twenty-four; and their powers are coextensive with those of the Assembly,
and reach objects which are most dear to the people — life, liberty, and
property.
Sir, we hear constantly a great deal which is rather calculated to awake our
passions, and create prejudices, than to conduct us to the truth, and teach us
our real interests. I do not suppose this to be the design of the gentlemen.
Why, then, are we told so often of an aristocracy? For my part, I hardly know
the meaning of this word, as it is applied. If all we hear be true, this
government is really a very bad one. But who are the aristocracy among us? Where
do we find men elevated to a perpetual rank above their fellow-citizens, and
possessing powers entirely independent of them? The arguments of the gentlemen
only go to prove that there are men who are rich, men who are poor, some who are
wise, and others who are not; that, indeed, every distinguished man is an
aristocrat. This reminds me of a description of the aristocrats I have seen in a
late publication styled the Federal Farmer. The author reckons in the
aristocracy all governors of states, members of Congress, chief magistrates, and
all officers of the militia. This description, I presume to say, is ridiculous.
The image is a phantom. Does the new government render a rich man more eligible
than a poor one? No. It requires no such qualification. It is bottomed on the
broad and equal principle of your state constitution.
Sir, if the people have it in their option to elect their most meritorious
men, is this to be considered as an objection? Shall the Constitution oppose
their wishes, and abridge their most invaluable privilege? While property
continues to be pretty equally divided, and a considerable share of information
pervades the community, the tendency of the people's suffrages will be to
elevate merit even from obscurity. As riches increase and accumulate in few
hands, as luxury prevails in society, virtue will be in a greater degree
considered as only a graceful appendage of wealth, and the tendency of things
will be to depart from the republican standard. This is the real disposition of
human nature: it is what neither the honorable member nor myself can correct; it
is a common misfortune, that awaits our state constitution as well as all
others.
There is an advantage incident to large districts of election, which perhaps
the gentlemen, amidst all their apprehensions of influence and bribery, have not
adverted to. In large districts, the corruption of the electors is much more
difficult; combinations for the purposes of intrigue are less easily formed;
factions and cabals are little known. In a small district, wealth will have a
more complete influence, because the people in the vicinity of a great man are
more immediately his dependants, and because this influence has fewer objects to
act upon. It has been remarked, that it would be disagreeable to the middle
class of men to go to the seat of the new government. If this be so, the
difficulty will be enhanced by the gentleman's proposal. If his argument be
true, it proves that the larger the representation is, the less will be your
chance of having it filled. But it appears to me frivolous to bring forward such
arguments as these. It has answered no other purpose than to induce me, by way
of reply, to enter into discussion, which I consider as useless, and not
applicable to our subject.
It is a harsh doctrine that men grow wicked in proportion as they improve and
enlighten their minds. Experience has by no means justified us in the
supposition that there is more virtue in one class of men than in another. Look
through the rich and the poor of the community, the learned and the ignorant.
Where does virtue predominate? The difference indeed consists, not in the
quantity, hut kind, of vices which are incident to various classes; and here the
advantage of character belongs to the wealthy. Their vices are probably more
favorable to the prosperity of the state than those of the indigent, and partake
less of moral depravity.
After all, sir, we must submit to this idea, that the true principle of a
republic is, that the people should choose whom they please to govern them.
Representation is imperfect in proportion as the current of popular favor is
checked. This great source of free government, popular election, should be
perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allowed. Where this principle is
adhered to; where, in the organization of the government, the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches are rendered distinct; where, again, the
legislature is divided into separate houses, and the operations of each are
controlled by various checks and balances, and, above all, by the vigilance and
weight of the stale governments, — to talk of tyranny, and the subversion of our
liberties, is to speak the language of enthusiasm. This balance between the
national and state governments ought to be dwelt on with peculiar attention, as
it is. of the utmost importance. It forms a double security to the people. If
one encroaches on their rights, they will find a powerful protection in the
other. Indeed, they will both be prevented from overpassing their constitutional
limits, by a certain rivalship, which will ever subsist between them. I am
persuaded that a firm union is as necessary to perpetuate our liberties as it is
to make us respectable; and experience will probably prove that the national
government will be as natural a guardian of our freedom as the state legislature
themselves.
Suggestions, sir, of an extraordinary nature, have been frequently thrown out
in the course of the present political controversy. It gives me pain to dwell on
topics of this kind, and I wish they might be dismissed. We have been told that
the old Confederation has proved inefficacious, only because intriguing and
powerful men, aiming at. a revolution, have been forever instigating the people,
and rendering them disaffected with it. This, sir, is a false insinuation. The
thing is impossible. I will venture to assert, that no combination of designing
men under heaven will be capable of making a government unpopular which is in
its principles a wise and good one, and vigorous in its operations.
The Confederation was framed amidst the agitation and tumults of society. It
was composed of unsound materials, put together in haste. Men of intelligence
discovered the feebleness of the structure, in the first stages of its
existence; but the great body of the people, too much engrossed with their
distresses to contemplate any but the immediate causes of them, were ignorant of
the defects of their constitution. But when the dangers of war were removed,
they saw clearly what they had suffered, and what they had yet to suffer, from a
feeble form of government. There was no need of discerning men to convince the
people of their unhappy situation; the complaint was coextensive with the evil,
and both were common to all classes of the community. We have been told that the
spirit of patriotism and love of liberty are almost extinguished among the
people, and that it has become a prevailing doctrine that republican principles
ought to be hooted out of the world. Sir, I am confident that such remarks as
these are rather occasioned by the heat of argument than by a cool conviction of
their truth and justice. As far as my experience has extended, I have heard no
such doctrine; nor have I discovered any diminution of regard for those rights
and liberties, in defence of which the people have fought and suffered. There
have been, undoubtedly, some men who have had speculative doubts on the subject
of government; but the principles of republicanism are founded on too firm a
basis to be shaken by a few speculative and skeptical reasoners. Our error has
been of a very different kind. We have erred through excess of caution, and a
zeal false and impracticable. Our counsels have been destitute of consistency
and stability. I am flattered with the hope, sir, that we have now found a cure
for the evils under which we have so long labored. I trust that the proposed
Constitution affords a genuine specimen of representative and republican
government, and that it will answer, in an eminent degree, all the beneficial
purposes of society.
The Hon. MELANCTON SMITH rose, and observed, that the gentleman might have
spared many of his remarks in answer to the ideas he had advanced. The only way
to remedy and correct the faults in the proposed Constitution was, he imagined,
to increase the representation and limit the powers. He admitted that no precise
number could be fixed upon. His object only was to augment the number in such a
degree as to render the government more favorable to liberty. The gentleman had
charged his argument, that it would be the interest of Congress to diminish the
number of representatives, as being puerile. It was only made in answer to
another of the gentleman's, which he thought equally weak — that it would be
their interest to increase it. It appeared to him, he said, evident that the
relative interests of the states would not he in the least degree increased by
augmenting the numbers. The honorable member had assured the committee that the
states would be checks upon the general government, and had pledged himself to
point out and demonstrate the operation of these checks. For his own part, he
could see no possibility of checking a government of independent powers, which
extended to all objects and resources without limitation. What he lamented was,
that no constitutional checks were provided — such checks as would not leave the
exercise of government to the operation of causes which, in their nature, are
variable and uncertain.
The honorable member had observed, that the confidence of the people was not
necessarily connected with the number of their rulers, and had cited the ephori
of Sparta, and the tribunes in Rome, as examples. But it ought to be considered,
that, in those places, the people were to contend with a body of hereditary
nobles; they would, therefore, naturally have confidence in a few men who were
their leaders in the constant struggle for liberty. The comparison between the
representations of several states did not better apply. New York had but
sixty-five representatives in Assembly. But because sixty-five was a proper
representation of two hundred and forty thousand, did it follow that it was also
sufficient for three millions? The state legislatures had not the powers of the
general government, and were not competent to those important regulations which
might endanger liberty.
The gentleman, continued Mr. Smith, had ridiculed his idea of an aristocracy,
and had entered into a definition of the word. He himself agreed to this
definition, but the dispute was not of words, but things. He was convinced that
in every society there were certain men exalted above the rest. These men he did
not consider as destitute of morality or virtue. He only insisted that they
could not feel sympathetically the wants of the people.
The Hon. Mr. LANSING said that, in the course of the observations made on the
paragraph under consideration, it had been shown that the democratic branch
ought to possess the feelings of the people, and be above corruption. It was,
therefore, with propriety contended that the House of Representatives ought to
be large. This had been objected to, he said, because it was difficult to
ascertain the precise number proper for this end. But though we could not always
hit the exact medium, yet we could generally avoid the extremes. Allowing that
it was the interest of the larger states to increase the representation, yet it
would be imprudent to trust a matter of such infinite importance to
possibilities, or the uncertain operations of interest. He said, we had it now
in our power to fix and provide for the operations of this government; and we
ought to embrace the opportunity. An honorable gentleman had said, that the
state of New York had trusted her liberties to a few men. But was this a reason
why the rights of the United States should be submitted to an equal number? The
representatives of New York, in Assembly, were chosen from all parts of the
state; they were intimately connected with and dependent on the people. In the
general government, they were to be selected from the superior class of
citizens, and subject to little or no control. Would it be prudent, said he, to
trust the affairs of this extensive continent to a body of men, forty-six of
whom would be competent to pass laws, and twenty-four of these a majority? The
House of Commons of Great Britain consisted of more than eight times the number,
and yet that house had been frequently corrupted. How much more easily might so
small a body as the Congress be infected!
His Excellency, Gov. CLINTON. I rise, Mr. Chairman, to make a few
observations, with a view to obtain information, and to discover on which side
of this important question the truth rests. I have attended, with pleasure, to
the gentlemen who have spoken before me. They appear, however, to have omitted
some considerations, which have tended to convince my mind, that the
representation in Congress ought to be more comprehensive and full than is
proposed by this Constitution. It is said, that the representation of this state
in the legislature is smaller than the representation of the United States will
be in the general government. Hence it is inferred that the federal government,
which, it is said, does not embrace more interesting powers than that of the
states, will be more favorable to the liberties of the people, on the principle
that safety consists in numbers. This appears plausible at first view; but if we
examine it, we shall discover it to be only plausible. The cases, indeed, are so
different, as to admit of little comparison; and this dissimilarity depends on
the difference of extent of territory. Each state is but a narrow district,
compared with the United States. The situation of its commerce, its agriculture,
and the system of its resources, will be proportionably more uniform and simple.
To a knowledge of these circumstances, therefore, every member of the state
legislature will be in some degree competent. He will have a considerable share
of information necessary for enacting laws which are to operate in every part of
the state. The easy communication with a large number of representatives, from
the minute districts of the state, will increase his acquaintance with the
public wants. All the representatives, having the same advantages, will furnish
a mass of information, which will be the securest defence from error How
different will be the situation of the general government! The body of the
legislature will be totally unacquainted with all those local circumstances of
any particular state, which mark the proper objects of laws, and especially of
taxation. A few men, possessed of but a very general knowledge of these objects,
must alone furnish Congress with that information on which they are to act; and
on these few men, in the most interesting transactions, must they rely. Do not
these considerations afford reasons for an enlargement of the
representation?
Another argument may be suggested to show, that there will be more safety in
the state than in the federal government. In the state, the legislators, being
generally known, and under the perpetual observation of their fellow-citizens,
feel strongly the check resulting from the facility of communication and
discovery. In a small territory, maladministration is easily corrected, and
designs unfavorable to liberty frustrated and punished. But in large
confederacies, the alarm excited by small and gradual encroachments rarely
extends to the distant members, or inspires a general spirit of resistance. When
we take a view of the United States, we find them embracing interests as various
as their territory is extensive. Their habits, their productions, their
resources, and their political and commercial regulations, are as different as
those of any nation upon earth. A general law, therefore, which might be well
calculated for Georgia. might operate most disadvantageously and cruelly upon
New York. However, I only suggest these observations, for the purpose of hearing
them satisfactorily answered. I am open to conviction, and if my objections can
be removed, I shall be ready frankly to acknowledge their weakness.
The Hon. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise to take notice of the observation
of the honorable member from Ulster. I imagine the objections he has stated are
susceptible of a complete and satisfactory refutation. But, before I proceed to
this, I shall attend to the arguments advanced by the gentleman from Albany and
Duchess. These arguments have been frequently urged, and much confidence has
been placed in their strength. The danger of corruption has been dwelt upon with
peculiar emphasis, and presented to our view in the most heightened and
unnatural coloring. Events merely possible have been magnified, by distempered
imagination, into inevitable realities; and the most distant and doubtful
conjectures have been formed into a serious and infallible prediction. In the
same spirit, the most fallacious calculations have been made. The lowest
possible quorum has been contemplated, as the number to transact important
business; and a majority of these to decide in all cases on questions of
infinite moment. Allowing, for the present, the propriety and truth of these
apprehensions, it would be easy, in comparing the two Constitutions, to prove
that the chances of corruption under the new are much fewer than those to which
the old is exposed. Under the old Confederation, the important powers of
declaring war, making peace, &c., can be exercised by nine states. On the
presumption that the smallest constitutional number will deliberate and decide,
those interesting powers will be committed to fewer men under the ancient than
under the new government. In the former, eighteen members, in the latter, not
less than twenty-four, may determine all great questions. Thus, on the
principles of the gentlemen, the fairer prospect of safety is clearly visible in
the new government. That we may have the fullest conviction of the truth of this
position, it ought to be suggested, as a decisive argument, that it will ever be
the interest of the several states to maintain, under the new government, an
ample representation; for, as every member has a vote, the relative influence
and authority of each state will be in proportion to the number of
representatives she has in Congress. There is not, therefore, a shadow of
probability that the number of acting members, in the general legislature, will
be ever reduced to a bare quorum; especially as the expense of their support is
to be defrayed from a federal treasury. But, under the existing Confederation,
each state has but one vote. It will be a matter of indifference, on the score
of influence, whether she delegates two or six representatives; and the
maintenance of them, forming a striking article in the state expenditures, will
forever prove a capital inducement to retain or withdraw from the federal
legislatures those delegates which her selfishness may too often consider as
superfluous.
There is another source of corruption, in the old government, which the
proposed plan is happily calculated to remedy. The concurrence of nine states,
as has been observed, is necessary to pass resolves the most important, and on
which the safety of the public may depend. If these nine states are at any time
assembled, a foreign enemy, by dividing a state, and gaming over and silencing a
single member, may frustrate the most indispensable plan of national policy, and
totally prevent a measure essential to the welfare or existence of the empire.
Here, then, we find a radical, dangerous defect, which will forever embarrass
and obstruct the machine of government, and suspend our fate on the uncertain
virtue of an individual. What a difference between the old and new Constitution
strikes our view! In the one, corruption must embrace a majority; in the other,
her poison, administered to a single man, may render the efforts of a majority
totally vain. This mode of corruption is still more dangerous, as its operations
are more secret and imperceptible. The exertions of active villainy are commonly
accompanied with circumstances which tend to its own exposure; but this negative
kind of guilt has so many plausible apologies as almost to elude suspicion.
In all reasonings on the subject of corruption, much use has been made of the
examples furnished by the British House of Commons. Many mistakes have arisen
from fallacious comparisons between our government and theirs. It is time that
the real state of this matter should be explained. By far the greatest part of
the House of Commons is composed of representatives of towns or boroughs. These
towns had anciently no voice in Parliament; but on the extension of commercial
wealth and influence, they were admitted to a seat. Many of them are in the
possession and gift of the king; and, from their dependence on him, and the
destruction of the right of free election, they are stigmatized with the
appellation of rotten boroughs. This is
the true source of the corruption which has so long excited the severe
animadversion of zealous politicians and patriots. But the knights of the shire,
who form another branch of the House of Commons, and who are chosen from the
body of the counties they represent, have been generally esteemed a virtuous and
incorruptible set of men. I appeal, sir, to the history of that house: this will
show us that the rights of the people have ever been safely trusted to their
protection; that they have been the ablest bulwarks of the British commons; and
that, in the conflict of parties, by throwing their weight into one scale or the
other, they have uniformly supported and strengthened the constitutional claims
of the people. Notwithstanding the cry of corruption that has been perpetually
raised against the House of Commons, it has been found that that house, sitting
at first without any constitutional authority, became, at length, an essential
member of the legislature, and have since, by regular gradations, acquired new
and important accessions of privilege; that they have, on numerous occasions,
impaired the prerogative, and limited the monarchy.
An honorable member from Duchess (Mr. Smith) has observed, that the delegates
from New York (for example) can have very little information of the local
circumstances of Georgia or South Carolina, except from the representatives of
those states; and on this ground insists upon the expediency of an enlargement
of the representation; since, otherwise, the majority must rely too much on the
information of a few. In order to determine whether there is any weight in this
reasoning, let us consider the powers of the national government, and compare
them with the objects of state legislation. The powers of the new government are
general, and calculated to embrace the aggregate interests of the Union, and the
general interest of each state, so far as it stands in relation to the whole.
The object of the state governments is to provide for their internal interests,
as unconnected with the United States, and as composed of minute parts or
districts. A particular knowledge, therefore, of the local circumstances of any
state, as they may vary in different districts, is unnecessary for the federal
representative. As he is not to represent the interests or local wants of the
county of Duchess or Montgomery, neither is it necessary that he should be
acquainted with their particular resources. But in the state governments) as the
laws regard the interest of the people, in all their various minute divisions,
it is necessary that the smallest interests should be represented. Taking these
distinctions into view, I think it must appear evident, that one discerning and
intelligent man will be as capable of understanding and representing the general
interests of a state as twenty; because one man can be as fully acquainted with
the general state of the commerce, manufactures, population, production, and
common resources of a state, which are the proper objects of federal
legislation. It is presumed that few men originally possess a complete knowledge
of the circumstances of other states. They must rely, therefore, on the
information to be collected from the representatives of those states. And if the
above reasoning be just, it appears evident, I imagine, that this reliance will
be as secure as can be desired.
Sir, in my experience of public affairs, I have constantly remarked, in the
conduct of members of Congress, a strong and uniform attachment to the interests
of their own state. These interests have, on many occasions, been adhered to
with an undue and illiberal pertinacity, and have too often been preferred to
the welfare of the Union. This attachment has given birth to an unaccommodating
spirit of party, which has frequently embarrassed the best measures. It is by no
means, however, an object of surprise. The early connections we have formed, the
habits and prejudices in which we have been bred, fix our affections so
strongly, that no future objects of association can easily eradicate them. This,
together with the entire and immediate dependence the representative feels on
his constituent, will generally in dine him to prefer the particular before the
public good.
The subject on which this argument of a small representation has been most
plausibly used, is taxation. As to internal taxation, in which the difficulty
principally rests, it is not probable that any general regulation will originate
in the national legislature. If Congress, in times of great danger and distress,
should be driven to this resource, they will undoubtedly adopt such measures as
are most conformable to the laws and customs of each state. They will take up
your own codes, and consult your own systems. This is a source of information
which cannot mislead, and which will be equally accessible to every member. It
will teach them the most certain, safe, and expeditious mode of laying and
collecting taxes in each state. They will appoint the officers of revenue
agreeably to the spirit of your particular establishments, or they will make use
of your own.
Sir, the most powerful obstacle to the members of Congress betraying the
interest of their constituents, is the state legislatures themselves, who will
be standing bodies of observation, possessing the confidence of the people,
jealous of federal encroachments, and armed with every power to check the first
essays of treachery. They will institute regular modes of inquiry. The
complicated domestic attachments, which subsist between the state legislators
and their electors, will ever make them vigilant guardians of the people's
rights. Possessed of the means and the disposition of resistance, the spirit of
opposition will be easily communicated to the people, and, under the conduct of
an organized body of leaders, will act with weight and system. Thus it appears
that the very structure of the confederacy affords the surest preventives from
error, and the most powerful checks to misconduct.
Sir, there is something in an argument that has been urged, which, if it
proves any thing, concludes against all union and all governments; it goes to
prove that no powers should be intrusted to any body of men, because they may be
abused. This is an argument of possibility and chance — one that would render
useless all reasonings upon the probable operation of things, and defeat the
established principles of natural and moral causes. It is a species of reasoning
sometimes used to excite popular jealousies, but is generally discarded by wise
and discerning men. I do not suppose that the honorable member who advanced the
idea had any such design. He undoubtedly would not wish to extend his arguments
to the destruction of union or government; but this, sir, is its real
tendency.
It has been asserted that the interests, habits, and manners of the thirteen
states are different; and hence it is inferred that no general free government
can suit them. This diversity of habits, &c., has been a favorite theme with
those who are disposed for a division of our empire, and, like many other
popular objections, seems to be founded on fallacy. I acknowledge that the local
interests of the states are in some degree various, and that there is some
difference in the manners and habits. But this I will presume to affirm, that,
from New Hampshire to Georgia, the people of America are as uniform in their
interests and manners as those of any established in Europe. This diversity, to
the eye of a speculatist, may afford some marks of characteristic
discrimination, but cannot form an impediment to the regular operation of those
general powers which the Constitution gives to the united government. Were the
laws of the Union to new-model the internal police of any state; were they to
alter, or abrogate at a blow, the whole of its civil and criminal institutions;
were they to penetrate the recesses of domestic life, and control, in all
respects, the private conduct of individuals, — there might be more force in the
objection; and the same Constitution, which was happily calculated for one
state, might sacrifice the welfare of another. Though the difference of
interests may create some difficulty, and apparent partiality, in the first
operations of government, yet the same spirit of accommodation, which produced
the plan under discussion, would be exercised in lessening the weight of unequal
burdens. Add to this, that, under the regular and gentle influence of general
laws, these varying interests will be constantly assimilating, till they embrace
each other, and assume the same complexion.
Gov. CLINTON. The gentleman has attempted to give an unjust and unnatural
coloring to my observations. I am really at a loss to determine whence he draws
his inference. I declare that the dissolution of the Union is, of all events,
the remotest from my wishes. That gentleman may wish for a consolidated, I wish
for a federal republic. The object of both of us is a firm, energetic
government; and we may both have the good of our country in view, though we
disagree as to the means of procuring it. It is not fair reasoning to infer that
a man wants no government at all, because he attempts to qualify it so as to
make it safe and easy.
Mr. HAMILTON. I only rise to observe that the gentleman has misunderstood me.
What I meant to express was this — that if we argued from possibilities only, —
if we reasoned from chances, or an ungovernable propensity to evil, instead of
taking into view the control which the nature of things, or the form of the
Constitution, provided, — the argument would lead us to withdraw all confidence
from our fellow-citizens, and discard the chimerical idea of government. This is
a true deduction from such reasoning.
Mr. SMITH then made a few observations; after which the committee rose, and
the Convention adjourned to Monday morning at ten o'clock.
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